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ABSTRACT
The Torres Strait Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea, ratifi ed in 1985, recognised customary, and limited commercial, indigenous rights in marine resources in Torres Strait. Since the 
High Court’s Mabo vs Queensland decision in June 1992, and the establishment of the Torres Strait 
Regional Authority (TSRA), effectively from July 1994, the issue of rights in marine resources has become 
central to the development of a sustainable regional economic base for indigenous people in Torres 
Strait. This paper describes the regulatory framework for managing marine resources in Torres Strait, the 
current value of the commercial fi shing sector, and the potential for expansion of the industry. Attention 
is then focused on current Islander participation in the industry, and especially on barriers and incentives 
affecting participation. Options for creating well-defi ned Islander property rights in commercial fi sheries 
are examined, and the policy implications of these options are discussed. Finally, the importance of 
further research is put in the context of the TSRA’s responsibility for a Torres Strait Development Plan 
and the goals of increased indigenous participation in commercial fi sheries and greater economic self-
suffi ciency for the region.
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FOREWORD
I n 1994, CAEPR made a concerted effort to focus a signifi cant proportion of its research effort on Torres Strait issues. This decision was infl uenced by a number of factors. First, a combination of the High 
Court Mabo decision in 1992, the passage of the Native Title Act 1993 and the formation of the Torres 
Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) in 1994, have given Torres Strait a special signifi cance in contemporary 
indigenous affairs policy in Australia. Second, specialist staff resources were available in 1994 to focus 
on Torres Strait. Bill Arthur visited CAEPR on secondment from the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Studies for three months (April to July). Richard Davis, a doctoral student in the 
Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, Faculty of Arts, ANU who also joined CAEPR for a short 
period, has resided on Saibai Island in Torres Strait where he undertook anthropological fi eldwork. Third, 
CAEPR maintains a commitment to focus a proportion of its research effort on Torres Strait Islander 
issues.
This paper is one in a set of four CAEPR Discussion Papers, Nos 71-74, being released simultaneously. 
They focus on: socioeconomic change in Torres Strait between 1986 and 1991 (No. 71); socioeconomic 
differences between Torres Strait Islanders living elsewhere in Australia and in the Strait (No. 72); the 
development potential of commercial fi sheries in Torres Strait (No. 73); and the new Torres Strait Regional 
Authority as a political structure and its potential implications for future regional government (No. 74). 
Richard Davis’s discussion paper on the Saibai Island microeconomy and its development potential will 
be completed and published at a later date. It is anticipated that additional work on Torres Strait issues, 
some specifi cally for the TSRA, will be undertaken in 1995.
There is currently no readily available map that indicates the coverage of the TSRA. A number of people 
assisted us in eventually determining the current boundaries. These people included Benny Mills, Offi ce 
of Torres Strait Islander Affairs, ATSIC, Canberra; George Menham and John Spottiswoode, TSRA, 
Thursday Island; David Singh, Gai Popovic and Jo Victoria, ATSIC, Canberra; Graham Glover, Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Canberra; Alistair McGaffrey, DFAT, Thursday Island; and David 
Dobson, Australian Land Information Group, Canberra. The resulting map was drawn by Ian Heyward, 
Department of Human Geography, Research School of Pacifi c and Asian Studies, ANU. We emphasise that 
the map is preliminary and presented for research purposes; it is based on the best available information 
at October 1994.
Jon Altman
Series Editor
October 1994
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I n June 1992, the High Court of Australia found in favour of the plaintiffs in the now historic Mabo vs Queensland judgment. This decision recognised the potential existence of native title in land, but 
has not, as yet, been extended to sea rights (see Smyth 1993; Bergin 1992; Cordell 1991). Statutory 
recognition of this form of common law ownership of land under the Native Title Act 1993 similarly does 
not comprehensively address the issue of indigenous property rights in coastal and offshore resources.
Just as the Mabo judgment has had primarily symbolic value for those indigenous Australians with 
access to land under land rights law, one can ask how the Mabo decision will affect the property rights 
in fi sheries that have been largely earmarked for Torres Strait Islanders since the ratifi cation of the Torres 
Strait Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea in 1985. The main purposes of the Treaty include 
the protection of the traditional way of life and livelihood of the inhabitants of the Torres Strait and 
protecting the Torres Strait marine environment (Mulrennan and Hanssen 1994; Reid et al. 1993). Such 
treaty obligations extend primarily to customary fi sheries and the impact of commercial fi sheries on the 
marine environment and species traditionally utilised. The focus of this paper is on commercial, rather 
than customary, fi sheries in the Torres Strait. 
In recent years, there have been calls by the Torres Strait political leadership for recognition of Islander 
property rights in fi sheries (Smyth 1993; Arthur 1990; Scott 1990). These calls have increased following 
the establishment of the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) and its operationalisation from 1 July 
1994 (TSRA 1994). The TSRA represents a move towards regional self-government for Torres Strait; 
associated with such a move has been the statutory requirement under s.142D of the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Act (No. 3) 1993 that the Authority produce a Torres 
Strait Development Plan. The Torres Strait Regional Council area was geographically delineated in the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989. On 1 July 1994, the council area became the 
TSRA area. The TSRA has authority, in relation to indigenous but primarily Islander issues, over all islands 
in Torres Strait, plus the two predominantly Islander-populated communities of Bamaga and Seisia on 
the northern tip of Cape York. Arthur (1994:1-2) has divided the Torres Strait region (now the TSRA area) 
into three parts, which we term here the Outer Islands in the north, the Inner Islands clustered around 
the regional administrative and service centre of Thursday Island, and the Cape Islander communities. 
This paper examines the aim of the newly formed TSRA to create a sustainable regional economic 
base, focusing on the commercial Torres Strait fi sheries sector estimated to have an offi cial gross value 
of production of $27 million in the 1992 calendar year. This accounted for about 2 per cent of the 
estimated total gross value of production of the Australian fi shing industry of $1.4 billion (Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) 1993a) or about 11 per cent of the gross value of production 
($244.6 million) of the Queensland industry. In stating its economic objectives for 1994-95, the TSRA 
emphasises the creation of a sustainable regional economic base for the Torres Strait area, with particular 
emphasis on sea rights, and the need to ensure that Torres Strait Islanders and Aboriginal people living in 
the Torres Strait area have control over the use of resources and management of the environment (TSRA 
1994: 16; Lawrence and Cansfi eld-Smith 1991).1 Associated with such regional economic development 
goals is a desire by the TSRA to increase regional self-suffi ciency and thus reduce regional dependence 
on Commonwealth welfare and program dollars (Arthur 1994; TSRA 1994).
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These economic policy objectives highlight the need for the TSRA to facilitate greater Torres Strait 
Islander participation in commercial fi shing, as this is one of the few potential avenues for regional 
economic growth that will generate employment and income for Islanders. The broad options available 
for increased participation are threefold. First, Islanders could reduce ‘latent effort’ in fi sheries that are 
currently operating below sustainable capacity. Second, Islanders could seek to enter fi sheries where they 
are currently unrepresented or under-represented. Third, Islanders could seek to have their customary 
property rights in Strait fi sheries resources fully recognised and then seek to utilise or trade these rights 
for monetary gain.
This discussion paper explores the complex policy options available. A brief summary of the fi sheries 
regulatory regime operating in Torres Strait is followed by an attempt to gauge the sustainable 
development potential of fi sheries in Torres Strait with reference to secondary sources about the 
current and potential value of all commercial fi sheries in the Strait.2 Examination of the extent of 
Islander involvement in commercial fi sheries involves assessing whether previously identifi ed barriers 
have been ameliorated and whether new barriers to indigenous participation in fi sheries are evident. 
Of greatest policy relevance, we ask what potential exists for the expansion of Islander participation 
in fi sheries. What options are available to the TSRA to either remove or reduce barriers to entry and to 
utilise commercial concessions and competitive advantage? Finally, some issues for further research are 
raised and the policy implications of greater Islander involvement in regional commercial fi sheries are 
discussed.3
THE FISHERIES REGULATORY REGIME IN THE TORRES STRAIT
The regulatory framework for managing marine resources in the Torres Strait emanates primarily from 
the international Torres Strait Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea. This Treaty was initially 
signed in 1978 and ratifi ed in 1985. At this time, the Commonwealth Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984
became law in Australian waters. This Treaty established the Torres Strait Protected Zone and the Act 
established the Torres Strait Protected Zone Joint Authority (TSPZJA) which is a joint Commonwealth/
Queensland State body. The TSPZJA is responsible for the management of the following fi sheries often 
referred to, with reference to the Torres Strait Treaty, as Article 22 fi sheries: prawn, tropical rock lobster, 
Spanish mackerel, pearl shell, dugong, turtle and barramundi. All other fi sheries in the Strait, which 
include trochus, mud crab, bêche-de-mer, shark and line fi shing for all species except Spanish mackerel 
are currently managed by Queensland under a complementary Queensland Torres Strait Fisheries Act 
1984 (AFMA 1993a, 1993b; TSPZJA 1993; Queensland Fish Management Authority (QFMA) 1993).4 This 
paper focuses on Torres Strait marine resources with recognised commercial potential (Arthur (1990) has 
discussed other possible fi sheries and aquacultures for Torres Strait).
The Torres Strait Treaty and associated legislation establishes a regulatory regime, of which Article 23 
is concerned with commercial catch-sharing between Australia and Papua New Guinea. There are two 
articles of the Treaty that are of most direct relevance to the issues addressed here. The fi rst, Article 10, 
notes:
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The principal purpose of the Parties in establishing the Protected Zone, and in determining its northern, 
southern, eastern and western boundaries, is to acknowledge and protect the traditional way of life 
and livelihood of the traditional inhabitants including their traditional fi shing and free movement 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 1978: 16).
Broadly interpreted, this article provides an in-principle and equitable guarantee to recognise and 
protect customary property rights in fi shery. The second, Article 21, states:
The Parties shall cooperate in the conservation, management and optimum utilisation of Protected 
Zone commercial fi sheries. To this end, the Parties shall consult at the request of either and shall enter 
into arrangements for the effective implementation of the provisions of this Part (DFAT 1978: 26).
This article has a very different focus from Article 10: it is concerned to effi ciently and commercially 
utilise the marine resources of the Strait, but provides no Treaty guarantee that the traditional 
inhabitants of the Strait should have their property rights in customary marine resources extended to 
commercial fi sheries.
The TSPZJA comprises Commonwealth and Queensland ministers with responsibility for fi sheries; it has 
established a structure of advisory bodies with Islander, industry and government representatives. These 
include a Torres Strait Fisheries Management Committee (TSFMC) and a Torres Strait Fishing Industry and 
Islanders’ Consultative Committee (TSFIICC). Both Committees have Islander representation nominated 
by the Island Coordinating Council (ICC); Islanders do not have the majority on either committee. These 
committees do not vote on issues.5 On those occasions where consensus is not reached, dissenting 
views are recorded. There are fi ve working groups (prawn, lobster, pearl shell, mackerel and licensing) 
reporting to the TSFIICC. Together these working groups initiate the majority of recommendations on 
fi sheries management. Working group meetings are well attended and in most cases, non-members 
freely participate. TSFMC, TSFIICC and working group meetings are held on Thursday Island to facilitate 
attendance from local community members (the prawn working group, however, sometimes meets 
in Cairns). Smyth (1993) notes that in the Australian context, Islander representation on the TSFMC 
and TSFIICC represents the greatest indigenous involvement in the regional management of marine 
resources. 
The TSPZJA is responsible for monitoring the condition of the jointly managed fi sheries and for the 
formulation of policies and plans for their management (TSPZJA 1994: 2). This involves, initially, 
negotiation with Papua New Guinea to reach agreement about the extent of fi shing effort, in terms of 
vessels and fi shing technology, allowed in Australian and Papua New Guinean sectors of the Protected 
Zone. The most recent agreement, concluded in February 1993 and covering the period 1993-96, allows 
Papua New Guinean participation in prawn and tropical rock lobster fi sheries in the Australian sector 
of the Zone and permits fi ve Australian boats to be licensed to collect pearl shell in Papua New Guinea 
waters, provided only three fi sh there at any one time. In 1993 and 1994, three Papua New Guinean 
freezer boats with 27 associated dinghies were allowed to take lobster in Australian waters. Papua New 
Guinea has not nominated any prawn boats for cross-border endorsement. Five Australian boats were 
licensed by Papua New Guinea to collect pearl shell in 1994.
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Table 1. Total allowable catch (tonnes) for major Article 22 fi sheries, 1985-86 to 1992-93.
Year ended 
30 June Prawn Lobster Mackeral
1986 1200 208 500
1987 1500 Catch of dive fi shery 500
1988 1500 Catch of dive fi shery 500
1989 1500 Catch of dive fi shery 500
1990 Catch of fi shery Catch of dive fi shery 300
1991 Catch of fi shery Catch of dive fi shery 300
1992 Catch of fi shery Catch of dive fi shery 300
1993 Catch of fi shery Catch of dive fi shery 300
Source: Annual reports of the TSPZJA. 
Australia and Papua New Guinea also jointly set Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for Article 22 Protected 
Zone commercial fi sheries. TACs for the period since ratifi cation of the Treaty in 1985 are summarised 
in Table 1. As Table 1 demonstrates, TACs have increasingly been set in terms of the catch of the fi shery 
rather than in terms of catch quota. However, fi shing effort has been managed in a number of ways. In 
the prawn fi shery, for example, new management arrangements allocate individual vessels transferable 
time quota (subject to conditions) of the number of fi shing days that they may operate in the Protected 
Zone prawn fi shery (Reid et al. 1993). These measures aim to limit both commercial fi shing effort and 
the extent of non-Islander participation in the fi shery. In the tropical rock lobster fi shery strict licensing 
arrangements are also in place for the non-Islander sector, but the major restriction on the catch is 
Table 2. Boat licences issued or renewed by the TSPZJA, 1985-86 to 1992-93.
Year ended 
30 June Prawn Lobster Mackeral Pearl Mixed Mackeral
1986 453 79 57 47 n.a. n.a.
1987 422 153 103 66 n.a. n.a.
1988 139 30 29 10 175 383
1989 135 54 43 9 179 420
1990 130 71 50 10 215 476
1991 119 79 55 11 262 526
1992 107 76 57 11 275 526
1993 100 58 62 7 291 518
Source: Annual reports of the TSPZJA.
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technological: since 1984 there has been a ban on trawlers taking lobster; additionally, lobsters must 
only be taken by divers using a short hand spear.
Table 2 summarises information available on the boat licences issued or renewed by the TSPZJA. This 
information has shortcomings that future research will need to rectify. For example, commercial fi shing 
licences issued by the TSPZJA include licences issued to Islanders as individuals but do not include the 
community fi shing arrangements, a special form of licensing which merely requires Outer Islanders to 
register with their community council before fi shing commercially.6 It is unclear how many Islanders fi sh 
under the community fi shing arrangements. (The substantive difference between the individual licences 
and community arrangements is that a boat licence allows fi shers to tax deduct expenses, whereas 
fi shing under community arrangements does not.) It is known for example that 300-400 dinghies 
operate from Islander communities in the lobster fi shery; most would operate from Outer Islands in the 
Protected Zone under community arrangements, but some also operate from Thursday and Horn Islands 
which are outside the Zone where community arrangements are not available. The issue of rationalising 
licensing arrangements in order to gauge Islander fi shing effort, but also to monitor total catches, will 
be addressed below.
It is important to briefl y describe the linkages and cross-cutting cleavages between the regulatory 
framework for fi sheries in the Protected Zone under the Torres Strait Treaty with the wide ranging and 
complex set of administrative arrangements currently in place for the Torres Strait region and described 
in some detail by Sanders (1994). Figure 1 delineates a number of these jurisdictions. Of greatest 
relevance from the fi sheries perspective is the boundary of the Protected Zone which extends from 
Australia’s border with Papua New Guinea to the north of the Inner Islands. 
As is evident in Figure 1, the Inner Islands and the Cape Islander communities are in fact outside the 
Protected Zone, as the TSRA area extends south beyond the jurisdiction of the TSPZJA. Conversely, the 
Protected Zone extends east beyond the area of the TSRA inside Australian waters, and north beyond 
the seabed jurisdiction line into Papua New Guinea’s territorial waters. While the TSRA is created by 
Commonwealth statute, its membership is elected under Queensland legislation. Indeed at present the 
boundary of the TSRA is delineated by the electoral boundary of the ICC. TSPZJA fi sheries management 
is jointly controlled by the Commonwealth and Queensland fi sheries ministers. State fi sheries (the 
unshaded area south of the seabed jurisdiction line in Figure 1) comes under the authority of the 
Queensland minister.
Since the TSRA is required to formulate a Torres Strait Development Plan including the articulated goal 
of enhanced involvement in commercial fi sheries for all Islanders in the TSRA, it is noteworthy that the 
TSRA geographic jurisdiction extends beyond that of the TSPZJA into Queensland territorial waters. 
The complexity of this regulatory regime can be clearly demonstrated with respect to pearl farming. 
Islanders are heavily involved in gold-lipped pearl oyster shell collecting in the Protected Zone, an 
Article 22 fi shery. Incomplete records from log books indicate that in 1992, a minimum 13,000 shells 
were collected by Islanders. Live pearl oysters are collected for pearl culture farms located outside 
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the Protected Zone, operated primarily by Japanese interests in the TSRA region. There is no accurate 
information available on the value of this aquaculture fi shery (Ward 1993).
CURRENT VALUE OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY
The fi shing industry in Torres Strait can be viewed as composed of three sectors: a commercial sector, 
an indigenous subsistence or customary sector, and a non-indigenous recreational-domestic sector. This 
paper deals only with the commercial sector, the value of which varies considerably with fl uctuating 
market demand refl ected in price. A recent incomplete estimate of the value to the catcher of the 
Figure 1. The Torres Strait region.
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
DISCUSSION PAPER N0. 73 7
1992 catcha Potential catchb Potential 
increase
($ million)Species Quantity
Value
($ million) Quantity
Value
($ million)
TSPZJA
 Prawn (tonnes) 2,035 20.5 2,035 20.5 0.0
  Lobster (tonnes) 158 4.5 500 14.2 9.7
  Mackerel (tonnes) 105 1.0 300 3.0 2.0
  Live pearl shell (number)c 13,000 0.3 60,000 1.4 1.1
QFMAd
  Trochus shelle 70 0.4 150 0.9 0.5
Total value 26.7 40.0 13.3
Sources and notes:
a. Tonnage based on 1992 recorded catch of the fi shery and price (TSPZJA 1994).
b. Based on estimated sustainable yield, which in the case of prawns is the catch of the fi shery; assumes 1992 prices for output.
c. Valued to the fi sher at $20/shell (Williams 1994: 75); only includes catch recorded by voluntary log books.
d. The value of cultured pearl aquaculture and bêche-de-mer is not included as there is no information available. Recent 
discussions with the Torres Strait Fishermen’s Association indicates that in the region of 20-30 tonnes of bêche-de-mer has 
been harvested to date in calendar year 1994 and sold at between $1.00 to $3.20 per kilo.
e. The potential for trochus is set at the current TAC.
Table 3. Current principal Torres Strait commercial fi sheries, 1992.
Table 4. Recent Article 22 commercial fi sheries catch, 1989-93.
Calendar
year
Prawn
(tonnes)
Lobster
(tonnes)
Mackeral
(tonnes)
Pearl Shella
(number)
1989 1,164 243 109 3,000-3,500
1990 836 183 99 16,543
1991 1,853 160 103 17,000
1992 2,035 158 105 13,000
1993 1,418 189 70 4,122
a. Only includes catch recorded by voluntary log books.
Source: Annual reports of the TSPZJA to 1992; 1993 data from Mick Bishop (AFMA) and Geoff Williams (Bureau of Resource Sciences).
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commercial sector is $26.7 million (see Table 3).7 As noted above, this does not include the value of 
cultured pearl farming which is not known to the fi sh management authorities. Similarly, there are no 
data on the value of bêche-de-mer. 
The estimate in Table 3 is based on 1992 data for Article 22 fi sheries and an estimate from various 
sources for trochus. It is important to recognise that the quantity of different species available varies 
from year to year and that fi shing effort will also be greatly infl uenced by market prices. Fluctuations in 
catch of major Article 22 fi sheries can be seen for the past fi ve years in Table 4. The commercial sector 
is dominated by two fi sheries: prawns which accounted for 78 per cent of the known total value of 
commercial fi sheries in 1992 and lobster which accounted for 17 per cent; that is, these two fi sheries 
accounted for 95 per cent of the documented total value of Torres Strait commercial fi sheries. The 
remaining fi sheries each form a comparatively small proportion of the total. 
Commercial fi shing is undertaken by indigenous and non-indigenous people from Torres Strait and, 
in the case of the prawn and mackerel fi sheries, by non-indigenous people from Queensland’s east 
coast ports (Arthur 1990). Generally, non-indigenous people are full-time fi shers while a small number 
of indigenous people fi sh full-time and a larger number fi sh part-time and work part-time on the 
Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme. In 1990 there were an estimated 35 full-
time indigenous commercial fi shers in Torres Strait and another 177 who mixed part-time commercial 
fi shing with part-time work in the CDEP scheme (Arthur 1990: 38-9; Arthur 1991a: 112). Given that most 
of the over 500 licences issued in recent years were issued to Islanders (see Table 2), it is possible that 
up to 300 more Islanders who did not participate in the CDEP scheme did undertake some commercial 
fi shing.
Production varies with each fi shery. Prawning is highly capitalised; the unit of production is an owner-
operated trawler costing between $200,000 and $500,000 with a crew of between two and four. Lobster, 
pearl shell, bêche-de-mer and trochus shell are usually fi shed from owner-operated boats with a small 
fl eet of dinghies or by dinghies alone, and fi shers may free dive or fi sh with the assistance of compressed 
air (hookahs). A dinghy and motor may cost $10,000. Mackerel is generally fi shed from dories; dinghies 
are also used, although they are an ineffi cient mackerel fi shing unit.
POTENTIAL EXPANSION
Fisheries are a renewable resource and sustainability is dependent on managing the basic stock so that it 
is not depleted (Arthur 1990, 1991c; Mulrennan et al. 1993). To maintain this sustainability the catches 
in key fi sheries are monitored and expansion controlled by fi sheries authorities. The prawn fi shery 
cannot be readily expanded; even with a TAC set as the catch of the fi shery, the catch appears to have 
peaked in 1992 (Table 3). In other cases the present catch is less than the TAC. Lobster, mackerel, trochus 
and live pearl shell are not fully exploited and bêche-de-mer collection is only recently re-emerging.8
The data suggest that the lobster fi shery alone could be more than tripled to 500 tonnes although 
marginal productivity (that is, additional dollar returns per unit of effort) in the fi shery would obviously 
decline as more lobster was harvested. At 1992 prices, if this fi shery were fully exploited, the gross value 
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of production could increase to $14.2 million. If other fi sheries were fully exploited, then the whole 
commercial sector could be expanded by at least $13.3 million dollars, an increase of over 60 per cent. 
It should be noted that, as a primary product largely oriented to export markets, the price structure of 
the various principal commercial species of the Torres Strait region are subject to marked fl uctuation 
over time. This will variously encourage or inhibit indigenous participation in the different fi sheries. 
However, the absence of accurate long-term data on indigenous fi shing effort means that it is unclear 
if effort is increased or decreased when prices increase. If, for example, indigenous fi shers merely fi sh 
to supplement cash income from other sources, like wages paid under the CDEP scheme, then there is 
a possibility of a backward-bending supply curve for labour which is counter to the usual response to 
market signals (Moses 1962). In other words, with increased price per kilo, fi shing-effort-associated 
total catch may decline. Similarly, it is unclear if Islanders readily switch from one fi shery to another, or 
from fi shing for monetary gain versus fi shing for subsistence need. An associated policy issue is that the 
imputed economic signifi cance of unmarketed customary fi shing effort for subsistence is not generally 
quantifi ed (Altman and Allen 1992).
There are insuffi cient data to assess the potential for the exploitation or expansion of many species. For 
instance, there is no information on the stocks of shark, though traders from the Australian mainland 
approached the ICC in 1989 with a view to setting up a shark fi shery in the TSRA. The only exploitation 
of this species to date has been illegally by fi shers from Indonesia and Taiwan who were regularly 
apprehended in the northern waters of the TSPZ in the late 1980s (Arthur 1990: 123) and as recently as 
1993. There is similarly very little data on both trochus and bêche-de-mer fi sheries.
ISLANDER PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMERCIAL FISHERY
To date, the primary interest of the relevant fi sheries authorities has been management of the fi sh stock 
and curtailing the expansion of the non-indigenous commercial sector, rather than proactively seeking 
to increase Islander participation in the industry (TSPZJA 1993: 15-16). The Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission (ATSIC), and the ICC who are responsible for indigenous development, do not 
monitor indigenous fi shing effort; neither did the former Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC) 
or Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA). Although there are some mechanisms in place that attempt 
to monitor total (indigenous and non-indigenous) catch, at the present time these data are far from 
complete and are not analysed. The TSPZJA does fund research, but to date none has been specifi cally 
on indigenous involvement and development in the commercial sector. The TSPZJA has funded the 
Commonwealth Scientifi c and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) to undertake detailed research 
on the traditional and island-based catch of the Protected Zone (see Harris et al. 1994; Dews et al. 
1993) and a system for monitoring the dugong and turtle catch is now operating in all Torres Strait 
schools (Williams 1994: 43). Overall, there is no system in place to monitor Islander involvement in the 
commercial fi shing industry, making it impossible to accurately describe the present situation and assess 
whether indigenous involvement is increasing, or decreasing, over time.
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Table 5 provides some estimates, based largely on discussions with fi sheries authorities, on the extent to 
which indigenous fi shers participate in each of the Torres Strait fi sheries. They do not participate at all, 
as either owners or crew, in prawning (the largest fi shery in dollar value terms), nor in pearl aquaculture, 
although they do collect most live pearl shell.9 Hence it can be safely assumed that both these sectors 
have only non-Islander participants. Islanders are not involved at all in species that represented 78 per 
cent of the Torres Strait commercial fi sheries by value in 1992 (see Table 3). Islanders on the other hand 
are estimated to contribute 100 per cent of the trochus shell and meat fi shery, 70 per cent of the lobster 
fi shery and 3 per cent of the mackerel fi shery.
This variable involvement across species raises the question of whether there are barriers to indigenous 
participation resulting from social factors and the structural features of the industry. Indigenous people, 
for example, may decide that it is not worthwhile to participate in some fi sheries while income can be 
derived more easily from another fi shery, from government-funded programs like the CDEP scheme or 
from fi shing for import-substituting subsistence.
BARRIERS AND INCENTIVES TO INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION
Previous research has indicated that access is a crucial factor in Islander participation in commercial 
fi sheries, whether in terms of physical access or human and capital resources; variations in these can 
affect the relative ease or diffi culty of participation in each fi shery (Arthur 1991c). Some issues that 
infl uence variability in commercial fi sheries participation are discussed below; they include current 
                    Percentage share of catch
Species Islandera Non-Islander
TSPZJA Fisheries
 Prawn 0 100
  Lobster 70 30
  Mackerel 3 97
  Live pearl shell 100 0
QFMA Fisheries
  Trochus shell 100 0
  Bêche-de-mer 100 0
  Cultured pearls 0 100
a. These fi gures include the contribution of some families long-established on Thursday Island who are of mixed ancestry and who 
may not be classifi ed, in some contexts, as Torres Strait Islanders.
Source: Discussions with AFMA, QFMA, Bureau of Resource Sciences, Torres Strait Fishermen’s Association, Queensland Department of 
Primary Industries and Master Pearlers Association.
Table 5. Estimated current productive involvement in major Torres Strait commercial fi sheries.
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licensing arrangements, uneven distribution of population and fi sheries resources across the Torres Strait, 
infrastructure requirements, skill requirements, collateral and capital needs, and the unattractiveness of 
lower profi t commercial fi sheries.
The current licensing arrangements are designed to increase Islander options for involvement in 
commercial fi sheries. Indigenous people can fi sh commercially under an arrangement called ‘community 
fi shing’ where normal licence requirements are waived. Further, three prawning licences have been 
reserved for indigenous people and, as the average current market value of a prawn licence to a non-
indigenous fi sher is $70,000, this represents a signifi cant potential concession to enter the fi shery.10 
However, these licences have not been utilised, due in large part to the major fi nancial commitment 
required to operate a prawn trawler. It has also been observed that the demands of employment in the 
commercial prawn fi shery do not make this fi shery attractive for Islanders owing to the need to work 
long continuous shifts for several months at a time (Arthur 1990: 117).
Both the Islander population and the fi sheries are unevenly distributed across Torres Strait. As most 
indigenous people only have small aluminium dinghies with limited range there is variable access to 
marine resources that favours those inhabited islands closest to each species. The western islands have 
proximity to the best lobster reefs, the central islands have reasonable access to lobster and good 
access to trochus, the eastern islands have less access to lobster and trochus, while the northern islands 
have almost no access to any of these species (for further details see maps in Arthur 1990: 44-5). This 
unevenness is refl ected in income derived from commercial fi shing. In 1990 people in the western islands 
had a fi shing income of $1,166 per head per year, people of the central islands had $953 per head per 
year, people of the eastern islands had $554 per head per year, and people of the northern islands had 
no income from commercial fi shing (Arthur 1991c: 11).11 
Participation by indigenous people in the commercial fi shing industry is also infl uenced by the level of 
infrastructure required. In particular, freezer units are an essential part of a successful operation in Torres 
Strait. Access to freezer units on islands has been diffi cult, especially as indigenous people are relatively 
unskilled at maintaining freezer plants.
Not all Islanders are skilled commercial fi shers; they may know the waters of the Strait but are not 
necessarily skilled in all aspects of the fi sheries. They do not, for example, have the skills necessary to 
operate and maintain prawning trawlers and the critical refrigeration equipment required; or knowledge 
of how to handle mackerel for market; and they may not have successfully passed on the skills they had 
in the past for processing bêche-de-mer. It is interesting to note that trochus and pearl shell collection, 
both areas in which indigenous producers are dominant, are also areas where they have long-standing 
involvement and expertise. 
The issue of capital accumulation looms large as a major barrier to entry into commercial fi sheries like 
the prawn fi shery. Few Islanders have the fi nancial resources to independently purchase a prawn trawler 
or a lobster freezer boat. Commercial loans are an option and banking facilities exist on Thursday Island. 
Indeed, a commercial bank is used by many Islanders for loans to purchase dinghies and motors and 
repayment rates are very high. However, few, if any, indigenous entrepreneurs would have an adequate 
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deposit and/or individually-owned collateral to raise a loan to purchase a prawn boat. This remains, 
to some extent, a hypothetical barrier, because there is no evidence that any individual Islanders are 
seeking to enter the commercial fi shery sector at this level.
Some fi sheries, such as lobster, have an extremely high profi t margin, with fi shers able to make 
considerable sums quickly. For example, at present, export quality lobster tail fetches $35-40 per kilo. 
Under such circumstances, fi shers are reluctant to expand into other lower profi t fi sheries, such as 
bêche-de-mer and mackerel. It also appears that many people mix fi shing with part-time work in the 
CDEP scheme which provides a base income. There is a possibility that such an income option operates 
as a disincentive to increasing fi shing effort. Alternatively, the need to participate in the CDEP scheme 
two or three days a week may hamper participation in commercial fi shing precisely when tides are ideal 
(Arthur 1991b). In the absence of any longitudinal data it is diffi cult to assess the impact of the CDEP 
scheme on fi shing effort.
Finally, it has been suggested in the past that issues of access to, and development of, commercial 
fi sheries for Islanders could be addressed by a development agency (Arthur 1990; Lea et al. 1990). 
At present there is no one agency established to facilitate the development of Islander commercial 
fi sheries.
OPTIONS FOR CREATING ISLANDER PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COMMERCIAL 
FISHERIES
Islander ownership of the sea and its marine resources, so-called sea rights, have not yet been recognised 
in either common law or statutory law anywhere in Australia. Indeed, even under existing statutory land 
rights regimes that have existed in parts of Australia for decades, indigenous property rights in resources 
have rarely been legally recognised. In the Northern Territory, de facto property rights in minerals are 
recognised when mining occurs on Aboriginal land, while in New South Wales some limited de jure 
property rights in minerals are recognised. There are States and Territories where customary rights to 
harvest renewable resources are recognised or where non-indigenous commercial fi shing interests may 
be restricted (Altman et al. 1993). However, such rights have already been largely provided to Torres 
Strait Islanders under provisions of the Torres Strait Treaty. 
The options for transferring full property rights in marine resources in Torres Strait to Islander 
interests, represented by a statutory body like the TSRA, appear limited to four broad options: assertion 
of sovereignty; utilisation of potentially confl icting Treaty articles as leverage; appeal for Crown 
compensation; and active participation. These options are briefl y examined.
Assertion of sovereignty
In the late 1980s, the Torres Strait Islander leadership of the ICC, a statutory body established by the 
Queensland Community Services (Torres Strait) Act 1984-86 and representing an estimated 60 per cent 
of the Torres Strait indigenous population, articulated a full sovereignty claim over the land, sea and 
air in Torres Strait. In a statement issued in 1987, the ICC made a claim that it must have the right to 
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raise revenue in the same manner as a State or Territory and the right to issue all fi shing licences (see 
Scott 1990: 406); this is tantamount to full property rights in marine resources. Smyth (1993: 140) 
notes that there is still Islander concern, articulated at meetings convened under the auspices of the 
Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) Coastal Zone Inquiry, that there are insuffi cient fi nancial and 
other rewards for Torres Strait Islanders from the commercial exploitation of the marine resources of 
their region.
Such a perspective is understandable and has analogies with the sovereign claims of Aboriginal interests 
in the Northern Territory that they should be vested with de jure property rights in minerals extracted 
from land held under inalienable freehold title, a view supported by the Industry Commission (1991).12
While a radical sovereignty claim would provide a means to establish full Islander property rights in 
marine resources, such calls have been tempered considerably in recent years, with the Islander political 
leadership pursuing instead the more moderate and gradualist goal of regional self-government via the 
statutory TSRA option (see Sanders 1994). This more moderate option is not necessarily inconsistent with 
recognition of Islander property rights in marine resources.
Treaty leverage
The Torres Strait Treaty provides in-principle recognition of Islander prior interest in customary fi sheries. 
It may be useful to note developments in New Zealand, where Maori interests have utilised leverage 
provided by Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, that provided Crown guarantee of Maori access 
to resources, to negotiate for signifi cant property rights in a growing number of commercial fi sheries 
(Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission 1994). The Torres Strait Treaty could similarly provide some 
leverage to facilitate negotiation between the TSRA and the Commonwealth for earmarking a proportion 
of Torres Strait commercial fi sheries to Islanders. There is also an Islander view, presented to the RAC, 
that some activities of commercial prawn fi shers impact adversely on customary fi sheries (Smyth 1993: 
140). This view is not, however, unchallenged. CSIRO research indicates that the prawning by-catch 
does not include the largely reef species utilised in customary fi sheries. Williams (1994: 67-9) notes that 
there is also evidence that prawning has a detrimental affect on some species. Islanders have expressed 
interest in a three-mile exclusion zone around each island in Torres Strait (Smyth 1993: 64). Such a zone 
will mainly protect customary reef fi sheries, although some Islands have signifi cant commercial lobster 
resources within a three-mile exclusion zone.
While Islanders were not signatories to the Torres Strait Treaty, the Commonwealth was nevertheless 
charged with representing their interests as citizens. It is noteworthy, however, that the Treaty both 
protects customary fi sheries and makes a commitment to optimally utilise commercial fi sheries. The 
Treaty provides the TSRA with a possible avenue to negotiate with the Commonwealth, but it is likely 
that prior commercial interests, especially in the prawn industry, will continue to be recognised. This is 
partly because, as shown above, Islanders do not participate in this fi shery. The established non-Islander 
commercial interests in the prawn fi shery, the most signifi cant sector of the Torres Strait commercial 
fi shery generating an estimated 78 per cent of gross value of production in 1992, makes its potential 
transfer to Islander ownership diffi cult. Additionally, the commercial success of the prawn fi shery in 
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the Protected Zone is interlinked with the eastern and, for some boats, the northern prawn fi sheries: 
annual fl uctuations in all three make a degree of interdependence desirable and probably essential.13 It 
is interesting to note that while the stated management arrangements of the TSPZJA seek to enhance 
Islander participation in lobster, Spanish mackerel and pearl shell fi sheries, it has no such stated objective 
for the prawn fi shery. However, up to three prawn licences with a potential maximum value of $420,000 
($500 per day, as discussed in footnote 10, times a maximum possible 280 days per season) are available 
for Islanders.14
Compensation: the buy-back option
A more likely avenue for enhanced Islander property rights in commercial fi sheries might occur through 
a broad compensatory economic development package that involves the buy-back of licences and their 
transfer to Islander ownership. Such a buy-back option has probably been enhanced following the radical 
restructuring of the prawn fi shery in recent years (Reid et al. 1993). At June 1993, only 102 vessels were 
licensed to fi sh for a total of 13,300 fi shing days in the Torres Strait. This can be contrasted with the 420 
vessels that were endorsed for the fi shery prior to reform in 1988 (Reid et al. 1993: 31).
The existence of such a large prawning fl eet in the Strait is likely to make a total buy-back proposal 
prohibitively expensive; the cost of a buy-back for prawn fi sheries could be in the region of a minimum 
$30 million for fl eet and licences. The multiple endorsement of all boats operating in the Strait further 
complicates such a possibility as transfer of licences to trawl in the Strait to Islander interests could 
adversely affect prawn fi sheries effort (and potential export earnings) beyond the Strait. One option 
here might be for a mandatory leasing requirement. A buy-back option for rock lobster licences, where 
there are far fewer non-indigenous operators, would be more fi nancially manageable. It should be 
noted though that buy-backs occur in fi sheries when there is a need to reduce effort for biological or 
economic reasons. Normal practice is for boats remaining in a fi shery to buy others out, sometimes with 
fi nancial assistance from government. Given that neither prawn or lobster have a biological or economic 
reason to reduce effort, it could be questioned whether government will use taxpayer dollars to reduce 
effort (and exports) for political imperatives. 
Active participation
It could be readily argued that the most effective and strategic means to establish Islander property 
rights in commercial fi sheries is via active participation. This is, in part, because there is a growing 
tendency in resource management schemes to allocate individual quota on the basis of past effort. 
This is already evident in the allocation of daily prawning quota at the individual vessel level. There is a 
current practice evident in the policies of both the TSPZJA and the Queensland Department of Primary 
Industries to provide de facto property rights in fi sheries to Islander interests via exclusive commercial 
access in some fi sheries. For example, expansion in all Protected Zone fi sheries is effectively reserved 
for Islanders (TSPZJA 1994: 8-14). Similarly, permits issued under s.58 of the Queensland Torres Strait 
Fisheries Act 1984 restrict fi shing for trochus and bêche-de-mer in the Protected Zone to Torres Strait 
Islanders, although currently the bêche-de-mer industry is embryonic.15
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Policy implications
The options outlined above can be broadly divided into passive and active strategies: passive strategies 
could see Islanders operating as rentiers realising a limited resource rental from non-Islander utilisation 
of regional marine resources, whereas active strategies require Islander participation as commercial 
fi shers, but with associated commercial risk. There are, of course, social implications emanating from 
these two options: the former involves no necessity for employment, whereas the latter will have both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefi ts.
These strategies generate a number of general policy implications. Associated with a passive strategy is 
the issue of the distribution of property rights. Active strategies, involving increased Islander participation 
in the commercial fi sheries, raise the issues of strategic fi sheries planning, and the monitoring of Islander 
fi shing effort and catch and the need for further research.
Distribution of property rights
As noted above there are persuasive moral grounds for providing property rights in resources to Torres 
Strait Islanders.16 There are precedents for such an approach: for example, the royalty rights accruing 
when mining occurs on Aboriginal land. Similarly, in New Zealand, Maori property rights in commercial 
fi sheries have been vested with the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission following the Maori 
Fisheries Act 1989; at September 1993 these property rights had been converted to assets valued at 
NZ$350 million (Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission 1994). However, it must be recognised that 
such transfer of property rights in resources invariably raises very complex policy issues about the basis 
to distribute such rights. In New Zealand, tensions have been very evident as the Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission attempts to devise a formula to distribute tradeable fi shing quota between 
sixty tribes. Some tribes argue that as commercial fi shing quota derive from Article 2 of the Treaty of 
Waitangi (dealing with customary property rights) they should be distributed on the basis of traditional 
ownership of coastline. Other tribes argue that the quota derive from Article 3 of the Treaty, which deals 
with Maori citizenship entitlements, and that they should be equitably distributed in accordance with 
tribal populations. 
A similar issue has been evident in Australia in the confl ict about the division of mining royalty 
equivalents and agreement moneys between traditional owners of the land affected by resource 
development and residents of such affected areas (Altman and Smith 1994). In Torres Strait, it is similarly 
likely that any transfer of property rights in commercial fi sheries to a body like the TSRA will raise issues 
associated with distributional equity, especially given spatial imbalance in physical access to species: 
will potential property rights in marine resources be distributed on the basis of customary or statutory 
sea ownership, species origin, customary utilisation of species or modern commercial fi sheries effort? 
There are indications from elsewhere in Australia, especially in the interrelationship between miners and 
Aboriginal interests, that active participation with indigenous interests as major stakeholders in regional 
economic development provides a more effective means to both reap economic return from, and to 
maintain control of, renewable or non-renewable resource exploitation (Altman 1994).
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Strategic fi sheries planning
As the TSRA develops the Torres Strait Development Plan, it would be useful to consider strategic options 
for greater Islander active participation in commercial fi sheries. The need for such a strategic fi shery 
plan was recommended by Arthur (1990) in a regional economic development study undertaken for the 
ICC in the aftermath of the 1987 full sovereignty claim, but such a plan has not been developed in the 
past fi ve years. 
There are a range of issues that could be addressed in such a strategic plan, including whether enhanced 
Islander participation should be targeted at particular fi sheries (perhaps those where Islanders have 
a competitive advantage rather than just a concessionary advantage); what extension services and 
commercial structures need to be established for individual and Island-based fi sheries; and the links 
between government programs, especially the CDEP scheme, and the potential for increased effort 
in commercial fi sheries. One important barrier that remains is an antipathy towards joint ventures 
evident, for example, in the reservation of three prawning licences for vessels wholly crewed by Torres 
Strait Islanders.17 Given the identifi ed barriers, like limited expertise and the capital and infrastructure 
reliability outlined above, it seems that joint ventures might provide an ideal avenue in the short- to 
medium-term to facilitate greater Islander participation in commercial fi sheries especially via active 
buy-in. A fi nal strategic and tactical issue of political import is whether a TSRA representative can 
become a member of the intergovernmental TSPZJA.
Monitoring Islander effort and catch
A major defi ciency that our research has highlighted is the absence of any data sets on the signifi cance 
of Islander involvement in commercial fi sheries.18 This is a problem that is increasingly being recognised 
by the TSPZJA, AFMA and QFMA. A major part of the problem is that effort is only monitored 
comprehensively in the prawn fi shery and the main part of the mackerel fi shery which is non-Islander. 
The annual reports of the TSPZJA provide data on licences issued, but do not differentiate Islander from 
non-Islander vessels (TSPZJA 1993: 9). Such a task is further complicated by the existence of alternative 
community fi shing arrangements that operate without fee by registering with community councils. 
Islanders are not required to complete catch logbooks and most Islanders who hold licences issued by the 
TSPZJA do not complete logs. Data on total fi sheries catch are generally collected from non-indigenous 
operators of freezers and carrier boats and aircraft. Problems with monitoring catch and especially effort 
and associated resource management issues are increasingly being recognised by both Commonwealth 
and Queensland fi sheries authorities and there are moves to rationalise all resource management under 
the auspices of TSPZJA. Consideration is also being given to introducing individual licensing for all 
community fi shing activity.
There is an urgent need for more transparent data sets on the extent of Islander involvement in 
commercial fi sheries in terms of effort and contribution to total regional gross value of fi sheries 
production. It is only with the availability of such data that a baseline can be established against which 
future fi sheries effort and catch can be assessed.
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In recent years there has been considerable research undertaken in Torres Strait under the auspices of 
the Marine Strategy for Torres Strait and Ocean 2000 Rescue (Mulrennan and Hanssen 1994; Mulrennan 
et al. 1993). Little of this research has focused quantitatively on the extent of indigenous participation 
in commercial fi sheries. Other issues that require further research include market research on options for 
expansion of under-exploited and unexploited fi sheries and ongoing research on the interrelationships, 
in terms of effort and available marine resources, between commercial and customary fi sheries. Such 
research is not cheap and it already appears that the cost of fi sheries management in Torres Strait takes 
up a high proportion of the gross value of production of the commercial fi shery. The expenditure of the 
TSPZJA alone is currently $3.5 million per annum. A strategic issue that the TSRA needs to address is how 
its particular research needs in this area can be met from existing resources.
CONCLUSION
As the TSRA moves to produce a Torres Strait Development Plan from 1995, it is imperative that longer-
term research is undertaken, initially to create a quantitative baseline of indigenous involvement in 
commercial fi sheries, and then to gauge indigenous performance and participation over time. There 
is evidence that opportunities exist in Torres Strait for both expansion of commercial fi sheries and for 
greater Islander participation in both existing and potentially expanding fi sheries. There is an urgent 
need for commercial structures to be established for Islanders to take advantage of these economic 
opportunities. One option is for a signifi cant Islander buy-in into particular sectors of commercial 
fi sheries. Such a buy-in could be fi nanced via the TSRA Land and Natural Resources Fund, a statutory 
mechanism established under s.144W of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
Amendment Act (No. 3) 1993. In particular, there may be options for commercial joint ventures, possibly 
with ATSIC’s Commercial Development Corporation, in the prawn and rock lobster fi sheries that may or 
may not require active local participation. 
Concessionary entry to commercial fi sheries is available to Islanders; utilisation of such opportunities 
could generate increased regional income and additional employment for Islanders. In this way, the 
stated TSRA goals of enhanced indigenous participation in commercial fi sheries and greater regional 
economic self-suffi ciency for Torres Strait could be facilitated (TSRA 1994). 
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NOTES
1. Throughout this paper the terms indigenous Australians and Islanders (referring to Torres Strait Islanders) are used 
interchangeably. In the 1991 Census 96 per cent of the indigenous population in the TSRA area (5,614 persons) was 
Torres Strait Islander, with the balance being Aboriginal. Torres Strait Islanders comprised 75 per cent of the total 
indigenous and non-indigenous population of the TSRA area in 1991.
2. Sustainability is defi ned as annual production being less than, or equal, to annual recruitment.
3. In general we make the simplifying assumption that for analytical purposes commercial and customary fi sheries can be 
separated, whereas in fact these two sectors are interdependent in terms of both equipment and effort.
4. The new Fisheries Bill 1994 is before the Queensland State Parliament. When passed it will incorporate the Torres Strait 
Fisheries Act 1984.
5. Following the declaration of an economic zone in the eastern islands of Torres Strait last year, the Committee on Fishing 
in the Eastern Islands of Torres Strait was established to report to the TSPZJA Ministers. The report is not yet available; 
however the report acknowledges Torres Strait Islander concerns about current consultation processes and recommends 
some structural reform (correspondence from Angela Winston-Gregson, Offi ce of Indigenous Affairs, Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 17 October 1994).
6. A community licence is available to traditional inhabitants of Torres Strait operating vessels under 6 metres.
7. The customary sector was valued at $1.6 million in 1990 (Arthur 1990: 31, 131) and there are presently no estimates 
of the value of the recreational sector. For further discussion of the size of the customary sector see Dews et al. (1993) 
and Johannes and MacFarlane (1991).
8. The bêche-de-mer industry had not been fl ourishing in the 1980s (Arthur 1990: 119). However there has been a 
resurgence in demand during the period 1992-94 (Noel Taylor-Moore, Queensland Department of Primary Industries, 
pers. comm.). Bêche-de-mer catch records are not maintained.
9. Indigenous people sometimes work as labourers on some of the Strait’s six pearl farms. The total employment in the 
industry in 1986 was 100 people (Williams 1994: 75-6).
10. Calculated as 13,300 days shared among a current (1994) 94 licence holders at $500 per day (Geoff Williams, pers. 
comm.). While licence holders and fi sheries authorities currently estimate the value of licences at $1,000 per day there 
is no record of sale at this price.
11. Richard Davis, an ANU-based doctoral student who resided on Saibai in 1993, has reported that some commercial 
fi shing did take place from Saibai, a northern island, in that year. This refl ects the dynamism in commercial fi shing effort 
within the region over time.
12. A version of this sovereignty claim has recently resurfaced in policy debate about Australia’s three-mine uranium policy: 
the Director of the Northern Land Council has articulated a view that if traditional owners of the Jabiluka prospect wish 
mining to proceed this should occur irrespective of Commonwealth Government policy.
13. Torres Strait endorsements are interlinked with east coast prawn endorsements (100 per cent) and northern prawn 
endorsements (31 per cent).
14. This estimate is a hypothetical maximum assuming maximum prawning effort. It is therefore higher than the average 
fi gure for non-indigenous fi shers noted above.
15. The TAC for trochus is 150 tonnes for the Strait, while the bêche-de-mer TAC is a State-wide 500 tonnes.
16. There is also scope for native title to be claimed over marine resources under the Native Title Act 1993 or at common 
law. The existence of such rights would need to be determined in a court judgment. However, it is likely that any 
surviving rights would be rights of use only, and not exclusive property rights to customary and commercial fi sheries.
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17. Fisheries authorities are concerned that it will be diffi cult to distinguish between a genuine joint venture and outsiders 
exploiting this option to gain entry to Torres Strait prawn fi shery. There are potential monitoring and enforcement 
issues to be resolved here that should not be underestimated.
18. Data are available on catch and effort by Islanders in the Protected Zone, though the data only refer to the Outer 
Islands. However this scientifi c research does not clearly differentiate commercial from customary fi sheries and is 
primarily focused on the sustainability of marine species in the Protected Zone.
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